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This paper studies the phenomenon of early hiring in entry-level labor markets
(e.g. the market for gastroenterology fellowships and the market for judicial clerks)
in the presence of social networks. We o⁄er a two-stage model in which workers in
training institutions reveal information on their own ability over time. In the early
stage, workers receive a noisy signal about their own ability. The early information
is ￿ soft￿and non-veri￿able, and workers can convey the information credibly only to
￿rms that are connected to them (potentially via their mentors). At the second stage,
￿ hard￿ veri￿able (and accurate) information is revealed to the workers and can be
credibly transmitted to all ￿rms. We characterize the e⁄ects of changes to the network
structure on the unraveling of the market towards early hiring. Moreover, we show
that an e¢ cient design of the matching procedure can prevent unraveling. (JEL: A14,
D85, C78, L14)
Keywords: Networks, market design, unraveling, entry-level labor markets, early
hiring.
1 Introduction
The timing of transactions is an important part of a market￿ s activity. In entry-level labor
markets, such as the market for judicial clerks or for medical interns, hiring a worker before
su¢ cient information is revealed on her quality can lead to ine¢ cient placement of workers.
Nevertheless, law clerks in the US are often hired by judges as early as the fall of their ￿rst
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1year in law school, medical interns were in some years hired as early as two years prior to
their graduation, and NBA teams recently draft high school seniors, skipping the college
stage entirely.
Roth and Xing (1994), document several markets that exhibited a process of unraveling
towards earlier and earlier contracting dates when market participants repeatedly ￿ jump the
gun￿ . Unraveling is found to a⁄ect the outcomes of markets with respect to both distribution
and welfare.1 Recently, Niederle and Roth (2003) document that workers￿mobility decreased
during the unraveling in the gastroenterology fellowships market that was triggered by the
collapse of the central match. The observation that early hiring is ￿ more local￿than late
hiring suggests that locality is not merely driven by the preferences of the workers to stay in
the same location as their training institutions, but rather that there is an inherent di⁄erence
in the way hiring is conducted in di⁄erent stages in the workers￿training.
The local nature of the hiring process is not surprising. Sociologists and economists have
long recognized that many workers ￿nd their jobs through friends and relatives.2 It is only
natural that social networks a⁄ect an inherently connection-based phenomenon such as early
hiring. Nevertheless, none of the earlier models of unraveling accounted for the underlying
topology of markets that motivate the study of unraveling, whether it is based on geography
or on personal connections.3
In this paper, we propose a model in which some ￿rms and workers are connected - e.g.
via personal connections of workers￿mentors. Our model consists of two stages in which
workers are in training institutions and reveal information on their own ability over time.
In the early stage, workers get a noisy signal about their own ability. The early information
is ￿ soft￿and non-veri￿able. Thus, workers can convey the information credibly only to ￿rms
that are connected to them, potentially by learning the mentors￿impressions of the workers.
At the second stage, ￿ hard￿veri￿able (and accurate) information is revealed to the workers
and can be credibly transmitted to all of the ￿rms. Firms that use their connections (and
hire promising candidates early) dilute the pool of high quality workers in the second stage.
1For direct evidence, see Niederle and Roth (2003 and 2005) and FrØchette, Roth, and ￿nver (2007).
2See also Granovetter (1974), Montgomery (1991), Bewley (1999), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004),
and Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005).
3For previous theoretical work on unraveling see also Li and Rosen (1998), Li and Suen (2000), Suen
(2000), Damiano, Li, and Suen (2005), Halaburda (2010), and Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010).
2The externality imposed on other ￿rms triggers a process of unraveling towards more and
more ￿rms using their connections and hiring early.
We model the pattern of connections between workers and ￿rms as a two-sided (bipartite)
network. A connection links a worker with a ￿rm to which she is able to convey private
information credibly at an early stage of her training.4 Two-sided networks are especially
adept to describing market interactions in which the roles are well de￿ned as in many labor
markets. By studying the e⁄ect of changes in the network structure on unraveling we provide
a rigorous analysis of changes in information asymmetries in the market and their impact on
unraveling. We ￿nd that di⁄erences in the patterns of connections can account for di⁄erences
in market outcomes, including unraveling. In our comparative statics, we focus on two types
of changes to the network structure: [1] changes that correspond to adding or deleting
connections from the network; and [2] changes that correspond to changing the distributions
of connections across workers and ￿rms.
There are several ways of adding links to a network. One way is by increasing the span
of the network - i.e. by increasing the number of workers and ￿rms that have at least
one connection. Another way is by increasing the network￿ s density - i.e. by increasing
the number of connections of workers and ￿rms that have at least one connection (without
changing the network￿ s span). We ￿nd that increasing the network￿ s density has a non
monotonic e⁄ect on unraveling. In particular, if a network is su¢ ciently dense then any
increase in density leads to lesser unraveling. An immediate implication is that a complete
market in an early stage of the workers￿training does not generate more unraveling than a
networked market. Increasing the span of the network always generates greater unraveling.
We further characterize the e⁄ects of redistributing connections across workers and ￿rms.
If the distribution of the number of connections across ￿rms is more polarized unraveling
is greater (a distribution is more polarized if there is higher density at the tails of the
distribution). This is consistent with suggestive evidence from the market for judicial clerks.5
4Di⁄erent mechanisms can allow to convey private information credibly over personal connections, e.g.
teachers or other recommenders may have personal connections with the hiring entity. Such are the connec-
tions between internal medicine departments and gastroenterology departments in the same hospital that
potentially allow for transmission of information about interns graduating from internal medicine internships
and looking for a gastroenterology fellowship. See also Fainmesser (2010), Fainmesser and Goldberg (2010),
and Karlan et. al. (2009) for a theoretical analysis of credible information transmission in a network.
5In the market for judicial clerks, attempts to set the date of the hiring of clerks failed repeatedly. The
3The opposite is true for the case that the distribution of the number of connections across
workers is more polarized.
We are also interested to answer the following questions: what is the scope of market
design in this networked environment? Can a better design of the post-graduation market
prevent unraveling? Consistent with much of the evidence from the market design literature,
we show that improving the underlying mechanism for matching workers and ￿rms in labor
markets leads to lesser unraveling. To this end, we o⁄er a simple parameterization of the
e¢ ciency of a market procedure in our setup. We prove that in large markets in which high
productivity workers are scarce, our parameterization is supported by a family of matching
procedures that follow from activity rules in both centralized and decentralized markets. In
particular, this family of matching procedures incorporates most algorithms that are studied
in the market design literature (e.g. deferred acceptance, random dictator, top trading cycles,
etc.).
This paper is also related to the literature on networks in economics. Calvo-Armengol
and Jackson (2004), and Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005) study models of job search
via personal connections and derive implications to inequality and unemployment. More
broadly, there is a growing related literature on network games (e.g. Bramoulle, D￿ Amours,
and Kranton 2010, Ballester, Calvo-Armengol, and Zenou 2006). In networks games each
player cares only about the actions taken by her neighbors. Galeotti et. al. (2010) suggest
that in network games the analysis is simpli￿ed if players are assumed to hold incomplete
knowledge of the network structure.
This simpli￿cation cannot be directly applied to our setup because a ￿rm cares not only
about the actions taken by its neighbors, but also about the aggregate outcome in the market
which depends on the actions of all of the ￿rms and workers in the market as well as on
the entire network structure. Nevertheless, we show that if there are many workers and
many ￿rms and if the network is formed with a su¢ ciently salient random component, the
assumption that workers and ￿rms have incomplete knowledge of the network structure can
9th Circuit (California) is often claimed to be the one to unravel ￿rst. The reasons for this are under debate:
the 9th Circuit judges point out that the East Coast judges have a geographical advantage as they are close
to more top-ranked law schools, suggesting that a close connection to candidates matters, and that it is
di¢ cult to prevent unraveling in the presence of a skewed distribution of the ￿rms￿degrees. See also Avery
et. al. (2001) and (2007).
4simplify the analysis signi￿cantly. This is possible due to recent graph theoretic results by
Fainmesser and Goldberg (2010) who study repeated games in large two-sided networks.
The large network approach leads to an analysis that has the ￿ avor of a mean-￿eld
approximation that is often assumed to approximate discrete and stochastic processes by a
continuous and deterministic process (see Jackson and Rogers 2007 for an example used in
the analysis of network formation). In particular, we approximate the number of workers
hired early via the network. However, as we are interested in equilibrium behavior, we take a
more explicit approach that provides bounds on the quality of the approximation and allows
us to derive the ￿rms￿and workers￿best response correspondences.
Finally, our model is di⁄erent both in approach and in predictions from earlier models
of unraveling. In particular, previous contributions focus on the heterogeneity of ￿rms and
candidates with respect to quality (Li and Rosen 1998, Li and Suen 2000) and preferences
(Halaburda 2010), and on the size of the applicant pool (Li and Rosen 1998). We share with
previous models the insurance element driving the unraveling process, and an agreement
that unraveling lowers the e¢ ciency in markets.6
In the following three sections we lay out the model and de￿ne the best response corre-
spondences for workers and ￿rms. In section 5, we characterize the structure of the equilibria
in our model and de￿ne a notion of equilibrium stability that captures the dynamic nature
of unraveling. In particular, our equilibrium analysis relies on an important approximation
result that is reviewed in section 5. In sections 6 and 7 we derive comparative statics on
unraveling with respect to the network structure and the matching procedure and discuss
the impact of unraveling on market outcomes. Section 8 o⁄ers concluding remarks.
2 A simple model of employment
There is a ￿nite set of ￿rms, F ￿ f1;2;:::;nfg, and a ￿nite set of workers, W ￿ f1;2;:::;nwg.
Each worker w 2 W can work for at most one ￿rm and each ￿rm f 2 F can employ at most
one worker. A worker w is characterized by a productivity level qw 2 fL;Hg. We assume
6Li and Suen (2000) suggest that ￿rms that do not unravel su⁄er a welfare loss. We extend this claim to
all ￿rms in an ex-ante sense.
5that production depends only on the workers￿productivities and normalize wages to zero
(assuming a ￿xed wage is consistent with the markets motivating this paper and can also be
substituted, with some technical burden, with milder restrictions).7;8
The payo⁄of ￿rm f from employing worker w is captured by (1). In the following section
we introduce heterogeneity to ￿rms￿payo⁄s.




￿H if qw = H
￿L if qw = L
(where ￿H > ￿L) (1)
Workers have idiosyncratic preferences over ￿rms. Speci￿cally, let worker w￿ s utility be:
uw (f) = 1 + ￿wf (2)
where for every w and f, ￿wf 2 [￿￿;￿] for some ￿ 2 (0;1). A ￿rm that does not employ
any worker, and a worker that is unemployed have a payo⁄ of 0.
3 The hiring process
In this section, we describe the process of hiring in the market. We start by an overview of
the two stages of the workers￿training during which they can be hired. Later, we review
separately the details of the hiring process within each stage.
There are two stages in the workers￿training, S = ￿1 and S = 0. At stage S = ￿1
workers are in training institutions (i.e. law school, medical school, internship programs,
etc.) and cannot yet be employed. At S = 0, workers graduate from their studies and are
ready to be employed.
Before stage S = ￿1 nature assigns each worker with a productivity level qw = H or
7Judicial clerks￿wages are determined by federal law. Medical residents￿wages are limited to a small num-
ber of wage steps. In particular, in the gastroenterology fellowships market, Niederle and Roth (2003,2005)
do not ￿nd any e⁄ect of unraveling on wages.
8The discussion of the role of wages in the analysis of unraveling is not new. Models of matching markets
can be analyzed using the assignment model (Koopmans and Beckmann 1957, Shapley and Shubik 1971)
where wages are a part of the clearing mechanism, or using the marriage model (Gale and Shapley 1962)
where wages are assumed out. Li and Suen (2000), who analyze unraveling using the assignment model in
the context of college admissions, admit that "our [assignment model] analysis applies with a greater force
to assignment markets in which payments transfers are explicitly negotiated￿ .
6qw = L with equal probability, and preferences f￿wfgf2F that are drawn from a distribution
H with mean 0 and positive density in every point in the support [￿￿;￿] where ￿ 2 (0;1).
The realizations of qw and f￿wfgf2F are independent of each other and across workers.
Workers and ￿rms do not observe qw and f￿wfgf2F but will learn about them over time as
described below.
We now describe intuitively the two stages of the training and hiring. In stage S = ￿1,




.9 In addition, worker w and her
mentors receive a noisy signal of her productivity (sw). The noisy signal sw consists of ￿ soft￿
information (in-class exam grades, reinforcements from teachers, etc.). In particular, there
is no o¢ cial document or public track record that allows worker w to prove that she received
a given signal. However, the worker￿ s mentors have pre-existing connections with a subset
of the ￿rms that allow for the credible transmission of workers￿signals to these ￿rms. If ￿rm
f and at least one of the mentors of worker w are connected, f learns sw accurately at stage
S = ￿1. Since mentors do not have a strategic role in our model, we say that a worker w
and a ￿rm f are connected if one of the mentors of worker w is connected with ￿rm f. Firm
f is not able to learn ￿wf for any worker w.10
At the end of stage S = ￿1, each ￿rm f can make an o⁄er to at most one worker, and a
worker that receives at least one o⁄er can accept one of the o⁄ers or reject all. If a worker
w accepts an o⁄er from a ￿rm f, both w and f leave the market and w works for f starting
at stage S = 0.
In stage S = 0, worker w and her mentors receive veri￿able information that indicates
accurately the worker￿ s productivity (qw) (transcripts, publications, etc.). Thus, qw can be
credibly transmitted to all ￿rms. We explore a family of matching procedures governing the
labor market in stage S = 0. If a worker w and a ￿rm f are matched, w works for f starting
9Assuming that a worker learns her preferences for a ￿rm only upon receiving an o⁄er from that ￿rm
does not change the analysis.
10There may be several reasons why ￿rm f is not able to learn ￿wf for worker w. First, a worker may
strategically transmit her preferences to her mentor. Second, mentors are likely to be able to misrepresent
workers￿preferences without being penalized by ￿rms in the future. The reason for the latter is unmodelled
in this paper. Informally, mentors are less likely to be held accountable by ￿rms for misrepresenting workers￿
preferences for several reasons: [1] mentors are not expected to be able to elicit workers￿preferences; [2]




and cannot be transmitted easily; and [3] the relation between
￿wf and outcomes that are observable by the ￿rm (acceptance or rejection of an o⁄er) depend on several
unobserved variables, e.g. which other o⁄ers the worker received.
7at stage S = 0.
3.1 Stage S = ￿1: early hiring
We now describe formally stage S = ￿1 of the workers training, including the information
available to workers, the network between ￿rms and workers, and the process of early hiring.
At stage S = ￿1, information about own productivity and preferences is revealed to the





are the worker￿ s preferences and sw 2 fh;lg is a noisy signal of the worker￿ s productivity. If





and a signal sw = l with probability (1 ￿ ￿). For ease of notation assume that if worker w has
productivity qw = L she has the reversed probabilities over her signal sw. The realizations
of the signals are independent across workers.
For each worker w there exists a set of ￿rms Nw ￿ F that can learn sw. Denote by
Nf ￿ W the set of workers such that ￿rm f can learn fswgw2Nf. Firms cannot learn ￿wf for
any worker w.
After learning fswgw2Nf, each ￿rm can make at most one o⁄er. Firm f can make an
o⁄er to worker w independent of whether w 2 Nf or not. Each worker w can then choose to
accept one o⁄er or none. If ￿rm f makes an o⁄er to worker w and worker w accepts, both
commit that after graduation (at stage S = 0) w will be employed by f. The commitment
is binding and both w and f exit the labor market.
We assume further that ￿rm f incurs a cost cf for hiring at stage S = ￿1, and let cf
be drawn from a distribution with a continuous cumulative distribution function D(c;c),
independently across ￿rms. There are two potential (unmodelled) sources for the cost: [1]
early commitment of funding that leads to a reduction in the ￿rm￿ s liquidity,11 and [2]
repugnance - in some entry level labor markets, such as the gastroenterology fellowship
market and the market for judicial clerkships, ￿rms are publicly objecting to early hiring.
11During the economic downturn of 2008-2010, employment contracts of freshly minted MBA￿ s were can-
celed at a (potentially reputational) cost to the hiring ￿rms. In the absence of a global ￿nancial crisis a
￿rm that su⁄ers from ￿nancial di¢ culties might incur even a greater cost because the cancellation cannot
be attributed to market-wide economic recession.
8Thus, hiring early might lead to loss of goodwill.12
Finally, we assume that
￿L < 0; and ￿ ￿L ￿ ￿H (3)
Given that a worker￿ s ex-ante probability of having high productivity is 1
2, condition (3)
guarantees that a ￿rm f does not hire a worker w if f has no (or negative) information
about the productivity of w.
To summarize, the timeline of the early labor market in stage S = ￿1 is as follows:
1. Each worker w observes a noisy signal sw. Each ￿rm f 2 Nw learns sw.
2. Each ￿rm f makes an o⁄er to at most one worker w 2 W [ fw0g. We say that a ￿rm
makes an o⁄er to worker w0 if the ￿rm does not make any o⁄er.
3. Each worker w who received at least one o⁄er decides whether to accept an o⁄er or
not. Worker w can accept at most one o⁄er.
4. If ￿rm f makes an o⁄er to worker w and worker w accepts, both exit the labor market
and worker w is employed by ￿rm f starting at stage S = 0:
Remark 1 Two assumptions deserve additional discussion. First, the assumption that each
￿rm can make at most one o⁄er is a simpli￿cation of the idea that the number of o⁄ers that
each ￿rm can make early is limited. In many markets, this results from the hiring norms
and technology prior to graduation. The market for Gastroenterology fellowships provides an
example. During the period before the match, departments try to hide from each other the fact
that they are making early o⁄ers.13 Making many early o⁄ers might expose a department￿ s
early hiring attempts before the department is able to hire. As a result, departments might try
12The discussion against practices of early hiring and exploding o⁄ers in the judicial clerkships market were
especially ￿erce. For a controversial defense of the common practice of early exploding o⁄ers, see Kozinski
(1991).
13This is demonstrated in the following E-mail sent by Debbie Proctor, the gastroenterologist who took the
lead in reorganizing the match, to the economists assisting in redesigning the Gastroenterology fellowships
market:
￿I￿ m answering 3-4 emails per day especially on this issue. ￿ I want to make sure MY competition is in
the match and that they don￿ t cheat.￿ Well, this is another way of saying that if they cheat, then I will
too!...Have you ever seen this before? The distrust amongst program directors? I ￿nd it hard to believe that
we are unique. Maybe this is [a] social science phenomenon?￿ . See also Niederle and Roth (2009).
9to make few o⁄ers that are likely to be accepted. An additional example of a di⁄erent ￿avor
is provided by the market for new MBA graduates. At Harvard Business School, periods
in which students are available for interviews are dictated by the school and ￿rms are not
allowed to invite students for interview during the semester. This puts a bound on the number
of interviews a ￿rm can make at every stage. Since an interview is required prior to making
an o⁄er, this restricts the number of early o⁄ers.
A second assumption is that an early agreement between a ￿rm and a worker is binding
and that an early o⁄er expires if it is not accepted at stage S = ￿1. Early o⁄ers that are
open only for a short period of time are often called ￿ exploding o⁄ers￿in the market design
literature. In many markets that unravel exploding o⁄ers are prevalent (see Niederle and
Roth 2009) and their acceptance is binding. For example, in the market for judicial clerks
o⁄ers are sometimes open for less than 30 minutes,14 and there is little evidence of law
students that renege on an early acceptance of a judge￿ s o⁄er.
3.1.1 Networks and information
If ￿rm f is able to learn sw (f 2 Nw and w 2 Nf) we say that f and w are connected.
We note that the sets of ￿rms, workers, and connections (links) induce a network. We now
describe the network structure, as well as ￿rms￿and workers￿knowledge and beliefs with
respect to the network structure.
We are mainly interested in large markets. It is by now widely accepted that in large
networks: [1] the underlying process of network formation has a strong stochastic element,
and [2] some aggregate characteristics of the network structure, such as the distribution
of the numbers of connections, are usually consistent across networks and time. Thus, we
assume that before stage S = ￿1, fNwgw2W and fNfgf2F are determined by a random
process that is described below. Firms and workers know the random process of network
formation, but do not have complete knowledge of the network. Instead, a worker w (￿rm f)
observes only Nw (Nf). Both assumptions ￿t well the labor markets motivating this paper
14Avery et. al. (2007) cite a 2005 applicant for federal judicial clerkships: "I received the o⁄er via voicemail
while I was in ￿ ight to my second interview. The judge actually left three messages. First, to make the o⁄er.
Second, to tell me that I should respond soon. Third, to rescind the o⁄er. It was a 35 minute ￿ ight."
10and can be relaxed at the cost of added technical burden.15;16
We now describe formally workers￿and ￿rms￿knowledge of the network: we capture
the network of connections between workers and ￿rms with a graph G ￿ hF;W;Ei, where
E ￿ F ￿ W is the set of connections (edges) between ￿rms and workers. The degree of
worker w (￿rm f) is the number of connections of worker w (￿rm f):
rw = jNwj (rf = jNfj)
Let ￿W (r) (￿F (r)) be the fraction of workers (￿rms) in the market with degree r for
r = 0;1;2;:::1. Note that specifying nw, ￿W (r), and ￿F (r) implies a unique nf that is
consistent with a graph G. Thus, we omit nf and let G (nw;￿W;￿F) be the set of networks
consistent with (nw;￿W;￿F).17
We assume that before stage S = ￿1 the network is chosen from G (nw;￿W;￿F) uniformly
at random (u.a.r.) and that worker w (￿rm f) knows: [1] the number of workers and ￿rms
in the market nw and nf; [2] the set Nw (Nf); and [3] ￿W and ￿F. We also note that
the Bayesian posterior of worker w (￿rm f) with degree r puts identical probability on all
networks in G (nw;￿W;￿Fjrw = r) (G (nw;￿W;￿Fjrf = r)). We denote by G(nw;￿W;￿Fj￿) a
member of G (nw;￿W;￿Fj￿) that is chosen u.a.r.
Some ￿rms and workers might have no connections (r = 0). To describe changes to the
network structure that do not involve such buyers and sellers we use a modi￿ed degree
distribution P. Formally, let P (r;￿W) be the fraction of workers with degree r as a fraction
of the workers that have positive degrees and note that
P (r;￿W) =
￿W (r)
1 ￿ ￿W (0)
15In section 5.1 we o⁄er a dynamic model in which the hiring process is repeated with subsequent gradu-
ating cohorts in subsequent hiring cycles and discuss further the motivation for the random process of the
formation of the network.
16The idea that workers and ￿rms have incomplete knowledge of the network ￿ts well the labor markets
motivating this paper. For example, a ￿rm might know several mentors, but might not know the students of
these mentors and their other mentors as these change across graduating cohorts and hiring cycles. Similarly
worker w might have several mentors and know which ￿rms they are connected to, but may not know how
well connected each of these ￿rms are.
17For any ￿xed nw, ￿W, and ￿F there exists an in￿nite strictly increasing sequence of integers fnwg s.t.
G (nw;￿W;￿F) 6= ; (see Greenhill et. al. 2006). All statements should be read as holding only for nw s.t.
the aforementioned set is non-empty.
11The de￿nition immediately extend to P (r;￿F).
3.1.2 Scarcity of high productivity workers
Many of the labor markets that motivate this paper are markets for highly skilled workers
(e.g. lawyers, physicians, psychologists). In such markets, the number of high quality workers
is usually smaller than the market saturation level.
De￿nition 1 We say that h￿W;￿F;￿i exhibits scarcity of high productivity workers if






De￿nition 1 includes all markets in which there are not many more workers than open
positions. In particular, we show later that De￿nition 1 guarantees that in markets that
exhibit scarcity of high productivity workers, the number of high productivity workers that
are still looking for employment at stage S = 0 is always smaller than the number of ￿rms
that are looking for a worker at stage S = 0.
3.2 Stage S = 0: graduation
We now describe formally stage S = 0, which we also call the post-graduation market. We
de￿ne and parameterize a family of market mechanisms on which we focus.
At stage S = 0 workers graduate from their training and obtain a diploma and a track
record that contain veri￿able information that reveals their true qualities fqwgw2W. At this




are still her private information. In this environment, the network is obsolete and we are in
a familiar setup of a one-to-one matching market.18
The market design literature shows that the outcome in a matching market depends
heavily on the underlying market rules.19 Since we are also interested in how changes in the
post-graduation market a⁄ect early hiring, we consider a class of matching procedures that
includes many of the matching procedures studied in the market design literature.
18Roth and Sotomayor (1990) provide a good introduction to matching theory.
19See also Roth (2002, 2008).
12Intuitively, a matching procedure is a function from sets of workers and ￿rms to a prob-
ability distribution over a set of matchings. We focus on matching procedures that are
anonymous - i.e. take into considerations the workers￿and ￿rms preferences but not their
identities; and that put positive probability only on stable matchings - i.e. matchings that
guarantee that no ￿rm and worker that are matched prefer to stay unmatched and no worker
and ￿rm that would like to be matched to each other remain unmatched.20 The requirement
that a matching procedure be anonymous excludes matching procedures in which there is
an ad-hoc reason that some ￿rms and workers are matched at stage S = 0.
The formal de￿nition of an anonymous matching procedure that guarantees stable match-
ings builds on de￿nitions from matching theory and is deferred to the Appendix. Instead,
we present now the main result of this section and discuss its implications for the modeling
of stage S = 0.
Let W 0
q be the set of workers with productivity q that reach S = 0 unmatched and
let F 0 be the set of ￿rms that reach S = 0 unmatched. Given G and ￿, and given a
matching procedure M denote by EG;M;￿ [uwjq] the expected utility of worker w 2 W 0
q and
denote by EG;M;￿ [￿f] the expected payo⁄ of ￿rm f 2 F 0. For given W 0
q (q 2 fH;Lg)
and F 0, denote by EG;M;￿ [uwjq;W 0
H;W 0
L;F 0] and EG;M;￿ [￿fjW 0
H;W 0
L;F 0] the corresponding
conditional expectations.
Lemma 1 shows that the requirement that a matching procedure is anonymous and
guarantees a stable matching pins down a unique expected payo⁄for all ￿rms that participate
in the post-graduation market. Moreover, the expected utility of high productivity workers
who reach stage S = 0 unmatched is asymptotically independent of the hiring at stage S =
￿1. Therefore, the expected utility of high productivity workers can be varied exogenously
by the choice of the particular matching procedure without a⁄ecting the expected payo⁄s of
￿rms.
Lemma 1 Let h￿W;￿F;￿i exhibit scarcity of high productivity workers, and let b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
be any network that is consistent with ￿W;￿F and nw. Assume further that no worker who
20In the matching literature, stability of a matching also requires that no ￿rm-worker pair prefers to be
matched to each other rather than to the partner that they are assigned with. However, in our model, this
requirement is obsolete because ￿rms have identical preferences over workers.
13receives a low signal in stage S = ￿1 is hired early (in stage S = ￿1 ) and let c W 0
H;c W 0
L; b F 0
be any W 0
H;W 0
L;F 0 that are possible under these assumptions. Then,
1. Given any anonymous matching procedure M that guarantees a stable matching:








j b F0j ￿ ￿H.
(b) for any worker w 2 c W 0




L; b F 0
i
= 0.
2. For every ￿ 2 [0;1] and for every ￿ > 0 there exists an anonymous matching procedure
M that guarantees a stable matching such that
limnw!1 supw









￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿
We show later that it is always true that no worker who receives a low signal in stage S =
￿1 is hired early (in stage S = ￿1). Thus, Lemma 1 applies throughout our analysis. While
the result is of interest on its own, we only use Lemma 1 to motivate exogenous variations
in ￿, and to establish that all of the market procedures that we focus on lead to identical
EG;M;￿ [uwjL] and EG;M;￿ [￿fjW 0
H;W 0
L;F 0]. The following de￿nition o⁄ers a parameterization
for the family of market procedures that our analysis covers.
De￿nition 2 A matching procedure M is parameterized by ￿M 2 R if:
[1] M is anonymous and guarantees a stable matching, and
[2] for all G 2 G (nw;￿W;￿F) and for any W 0
H, W 0
L, and F 0 that are possible under the
assumption that no worker who receives a low signal in stage S = ￿1 is hired (in stage
S = ￿1), the expected utility of a high productivity worker in the post-graduation market is










￿ (1 + ￿M ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ = 0
We interpret ￿M as a continuous measure of the e¢ ciency of the market rules.
144 Bayesian equilibrium and "-equilibrium
We now de￿ne the notions of Bayesian equilibrium and "-equilibrium in our setup. Note that
non trivial strategic decisions are made only at stage S = ￿1: ￿rms decide who to make
o⁄ers to, and workers decide which o⁄ers to accept.
A strategy of a ￿rm f is a mapping ￿f : R+ ￿ P (W) ￿ P (W) ! ￿(W [ fw0g) where
P (W) is the set of all subsets of workers and ￿(W [ fw0g) is the set of all probability




is a mixed strategy of ￿rm f with a cost
of hiring early cf = c, set of workers connected to it Nf, and that learned that every worker
w 2 f Wh ￿ Nf received a signal sw = h (and that every worker w 2 Nfnf Wh received a signal
sw = l). The ￿rm￿ s mixed strategy is over the workers to which the ￿rm makes an o⁄er at
stage S = ￿1 (￿f (￿) = w0 implies that ￿rm f does not make an o⁄er at stage S = ￿1). For









A family of ￿rms￿strategies that is especially natural in our context includes strategies
in which ￿rms ignore the names (or labels) of the workers and make their o⁄ers based only
on the economically meaningful attributes of the workers. Formally,









assigns identical probabilities to any w and w0 for whom at least ONE of
the following holds: [1] w;w0 2 f Wh; [2] w;w0 2 Nfnf Wh; [3] w;w0 2 WnNf.
A strategy for worker w is a mapping ￿w : fh;lg ￿ [￿￿;￿]
nf ￿ P (F) ￿ P (F) !
￿(F [ ff0g). Thus, ￿w
￿
sw;f￿wfgf2F ;Nw; e Fw
￿
is a mixed strategy of worker w that re-
ceives a signal sw, has preferences that are captured by f￿wfgf2F, a set of ￿rms connected
to her Nw, and o⁄ers from every ￿rm f 2 e Fw at stage S = ￿1. For brevity, when it is clear






sw;f￿wfgf2F ;Nw; e Fw
￿
.





be the expected payo⁄of ￿rmf that employs




be the expected utility of worker w who employs strategy ￿w. We are now ready to de￿ne
equilibrium and "-eqilibrium in our setup.
15De￿nition 4 The vectors of strategies f￿fgf2F and f￿wgw2W are an "-equilibrium if for all








f;e ￿f;cf;Nf;f￿f0gf02Fnffg ;f￿w0gw02W ;
￿
￿ "








w;e ￿w;f￿wfgf2F ;f￿w0gw02Wnfwg ;f￿f0gf02F
￿
￿ "
If " = 0 the de￿nition amounts to a Bayesian equilibrium in our setup. We now analyze
￿rms and workers best response functions separately and show that they can be summarized
using two random variables.














qw = HjNf;f Wh
i
￿ ￿H + Pr
h
qw = LjNf;f Wh
i
￿ ￿L ￿ cf
o
+
+ Prfw rejectsg ￿ EG;M;￿ [￿f]
(4)










Note that Prfw acceptsg, Prfw rejectsg, and EG;M;￿ [￿f] depend on f￿f0gf02Fnffg and
f￿w0gw02W. On the other hand, Pr
h




qw = LjNf;f Wh
i
are inde-
pendent of the strategies employed by all ￿rms and workers.
Now consider a worker w that receives early job o⁄ers (stage S = ￿1) from a set of ￿rms



















= Pr[qw = Hjsw]￿EG;M;￿ [uwjH]+Pr[qw = Ljsw]￿EG;M;￿ [uwjL]




the best response of ￿rm f (worker w) depends on
the network structure and on the strategies of all other ￿rms and workers only via EG;M;￿ [￿f]
(EG;M;￿ [uwjL]); and [2] conditional on the number of ￿rms and of high productivity workers
that arrive stage S = 0 unmatched, EG;M;￿ [￿f] and EG;M;￿ [uwjL] are independent of the
network structure. Combining observations [1] and [2] we conclude that equilibrium behavior
depends on the network structure only through its e⁄ect on the number of ￿rms and of high
productivity workers that arrive at stage S = 0 unmatched.
Formally, let ￿ be the fraction of workers hired at stage S = ￿1. Then both of the
following hold:
1. Consider a ￿rm f. Conditional on f Wh 6= ; and on the expectation that ￿ = ￿1, the
probability that f makes an o⁄er at stage S = ￿1depends on cf and is captured by







￿ ￿ ￿H + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L ￿
1




r=0 ￿F (r) ￿ r
P1
r=0 ￿W (r) ￿ r
￿ ￿H
￿
2. Consider a worker w. Conditional on ￿ = ￿1 and on w receiving exactly one job o⁄er
at stage S ￿ 1, the probability that w accepts the o⁄er depends on f￿wfgf2F and is
captured by




= 1 ￿ H
￿
￿ ￿ EG(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ [uwjH;￿1] ￿ 1
￿
(6)
Similarly, a worker that received exactly m o⁄ers at stage S = ￿1 accepts an o⁄er
with probability 1 ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿G;M;￿ (￿)
￿m, and conditional on accepting an o⁄er, worker
w picks the o⁄er that maximizes f1 + ￿wfgf2 e Fw.
Expression 5 is surprising because it establishes that in any equilibrium, for any given





of r;f Wh, and nw and depends on the network structure only via ￿W;￿F. Condition 5 also
captures the observation that the incentives of ￿rms to make o⁄ers at stage S = ￿1 increase
in the fraction of workers hired at stage S = ￿1. A complete derivation of (5) and (6) is
17deferred to the Appendix.
5 Equilibrium existence and structure
In this section we show that equilibrium in our setup corresponds to a ￿xed point of a
mapping from the fraction of workers hired at stage S = ￿1 to itself, and ￿nd that in
large networks, "-equilibria exist for arbitrary low ". Moreover, when ￿rms employ label-free
strategies, the set of equilibria is fully characterized as the set of ￿xed points of a simple
function.
Let b ￿0 be a random variable that describes the (common and rational) expectations of
workers and ￿rms with respect to the fraction of workers hired at stage S = ￿1. Consider
a mapping
￿0 =  G;M;￿ (b ￿0) =  G;M;￿
￿
￿G;M;￿ (b ￿0);￿G;M;￿ (b ￿0)
￿
that maps from the expectations of workers and ￿rms with respect to hiring at stage S = ￿1
to the random variable that captures the same outcome in stage S = ￿1. Any ￿0
0 such that
￿0
0 =  G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿0
0) captures an equilibrium level of hiring at stage S = ￿1, and any
equilibrium with ￿￿
0 corresponds to a ￿xed point ￿￿
0 =  G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿￿
0). However, for
any network G,  G;M;￿ (￿) is complicated as it depends on the entire network structure and
its outcome is stochastic even conditional on the network structure. In particular, for any
network with more than a few workers and ￿rms, a closed form expression for  G;M;￿ (￿) is
prohibitively complicated.
Instead of trying to characterize  G;M;￿ (￿) directly, we establish that in (asymptotically)
large networks and for every h￿W;￿F;M;￿i,  G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿0) converges to a well behaved
function with a deterministic output. As a result, we are able to characterize "-equilibria for
arbitrarily small ".
We now illustrate our analysis using a simple exercise: suppose that there was no cor-
relation between the degrees of ￿rms and workers that are connected - i.e. if we choose a
worker w 2 W u.a.r. and then choose a ￿rm f 2 Nw u.a.r., then the probability that rf = r
18is independent of rw and captured by
e P (r;￿F) =
P (r;￿F) ￿ r
rf
where rf = EP [rfjrf ￿ 1] =
P
r2f1;2;:::1g P (r;￿F)￿r. Now consider a worker w chosen u.a.r.
The probability that worker w receives a job o⁄er from a ￿rm f that is chosen u.a.r. from
Nw is
e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) =
1 X
rf=1



















e P (rf;￿F) ￿ [￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿ (1 ￿ 0:5
rf)=(0:5 ￿ rf)]




0:5m0:5r￿m￿1 is the probability that there are m other sw = h
workers in Nf conditional on jNfj = r. Finally, 1
m+1 is the conditional probability that
f makes the o⁄er to w. Given that the realizations of the signals, the o⁄ers received and
the acceptance of o⁄ers are independent across workers, if the matching procedure M is
parameterized by ￿M, the expected number of workers hired in stage S = ￿1 is captured by
e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) =
1
2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿W (0)) ￿
P1




1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) + e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿
￿




e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ = 1 ￿ H[￿ ￿ (1 + ￿M ￿ ￿) ￿ 1]
The calculation of e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) above follows a naive counting exercise. Namely, it is
equivalent to going over all of the workers, one by one, and evaluating their probabilities of
receiving at least one acceptable early o⁄er. Note that e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) is deterministic and
19well behaved. Thus, establishing more generally that for any ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ > 0,
limnw!1 Pr
￿￿ ￿ ￿ G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (b ￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (b ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿
￿
= 1 (8)
allows us to characterize the equilibrium structure in large networks. Formally,
De￿nition 5 we say that ￿￿ 2 [0;1] is a 0-equilibrium in large networks (or sim-
ply 0-equilibrium) with h￿W;￿F;M;￿i if for every " > 0 there exists nw 2 Z+ such
that for every n0
w > nw there exists an "-equilibrium with G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ in which
Pr
￿
 G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿￿) 2 [￿￿ ￿ ";￿￿ + "]
￿
> 1 ￿ ".
Theorem 1 characterizes the set of 0-equilibria as the set of solutions for a ￿xed point
problem in e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿).
Theorem 1 Let ￿W;￿F have ￿nite support and h￿W;￿F;￿i exhibit scarcity of high produc-
tivity workers. Consider a market procedure M that is parameterized by ￿M 2 [0;1]. Then,
there exists ￿ 2 [0;1] such that ￿ is a 0-equilibrium with h￿W;￿F;M;￿i.
Assume further that ￿rms employ label-free strategies. Then, ￿￿ = e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿￿) if and
only if ￿￿ is a 0-equilibrium with h￿W;￿F;M;￿i.
In Lemma 4, which is deferred to the Appendix, we derive a limit closed form expression
for  G;M;￿ (b ￿) without formally expressing  G;M;￿ (b ￿) for any ￿nite network G. To this end,
we rely on a recent graph theoretic result by Fainmesser and Goldberg (2010) that implies
that in a network that is chosen u.a.r. conditional on a degree distribution, as the network
grows, the degree correlation goes to zero. We then apply the law of large numbers to
conclude that the fraction of worker hired at stage S = ￿1 converges to the mean and that
(8) holds.
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on the analysis of 0-equilibria in regular envi-
ronments in which Theorem 1 and Lemma 4 apply.
De￿nition 6 An environment h￿W;￿F;M;￿i is regular if: [1] ￿W;￿F have ￿nite support;
[2] h￿W;￿F;￿i exhibit scarcity of high productivity workers; and [3] M is parameterized by
some ￿M 2 [0;1].
20Multiplicity. Theorem 1 does not rule out multiplicity of 0-equlibria. In particular,
multiplicity is determined by the properties of e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) which in turn correspond to
the properties of ￿W, ￿F, M, ￿, and ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿). For example, if ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) is concave
for every ￿ 2 [0;1], then there are at most three equilibria, one at ￿￿ = 0 and one or two
additional equilibria.
5.1 Unraveling
In this section we de￿ne unraveling as a dynamic process in which ￿rms and workers that
hire early (at stage S = ￿1) trigger a response from other ￿rms and workers, and the fraction
of workers hired early increases. We also provide a de￿nition of greater unraveling that is
adept for environments with multiple equilibria.
Consider an entry level labor market in which new cohorts of workers graduate in di⁄erent
hiring cycles (e.g. years) and ￿rms hire new workers in every hiring cycle. For simplicity,
assume that all cohorts of workers are of the same size nw. The hiring process in each
hiring cycle follows stages S = ￿1;0 that are described above. The network of connection
is re-drawn in each period u.a.r. from all of the possible networks with the same ￿W and
￿F. To motivate the changes to the network structure, recall that the network is de￿ned
by the connections of the di⁄erent subsets of mentors that each worker has. As the set of
workers varies across periods, so does the network. However, as we are motivated by large
markets, we follow the observation that large networks tend to maintain some aggregate
characteristics constant even as the network undergo local changes. The assumptions that
the network is selected u.a.r. and that ￿W and ￿F stay exactly the same can be relaxed.
In this dynamic environment, consider an unraveling process governed by myopic best
responses. At hiring cycle t = 0, an arbitrary fraction ￿0 of the workers (all with sw = h) is
hired at stage S = ￿1. At each hiring cycle t > 0, each agent best responds to the outcome
of the play in hiring cycle t ￿ 1. Let ￿t denote the fraction of the workers (all with sw = h)
that are hired at stage S = ￿1 in hiring cycle t, then
￿




21and any rest point of of the system correspond to a static Bayesian equilibrium. Following (8)
and Theorem 1, the limiting dynamic process (when nw is arbitrary large) is approximated
by
￿




and any rest point of the system correspond to a static 0-equilibrium. Note that e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿
has a positive slope for every ￿ 2 [0;1]. Hence, from any starting point, the convergence of
the limiting dynamic process is monotone, either upwards or downwards.
A dynamic process of unraveling, in which the market participants modify their strategies
based on the previous hiring cycle￿ s outcomes, captures the dynamics in some well studied
labor markets (see Roth and Xing 1994 and references therein) and suggestive evidence
from the experimental market design literature (see also Kagel and Roth 2000). Moreover,
considering the process of unraveling as dynamic lends itself to a natural way of capturing
the notion that some markets generate greater unraveling then other markets.
De￿nition 7 Let ￿t (nw;h￿W;￿F;M;￿i;￿0) =  G(nw￿W;￿F);M;￿ ￿  
t￿1
G(nw￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿0). We































De￿nition 7 captures the idea that an environment h￿i
1 generates greater unraveling then
h￿i
2 if from every starting point environment h￿i
1 leads to a 0-equilibrium with more hiring
at stage S = ￿1 then environment h￿i
2. The following Corollary is implied by Lemma 4
and establishes a useful connection between e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ and the unraveling generated by an
environment h￿W;￿F;M;￿i.

















and assume that all ￿rms employ label-free strategies. Then, if e  ￿1
W;￿1
F;M1;￿1 (￿) ￿ e  ￿2
W;￿2
F;M2;￿2 (￿)
for every ￿ 2 [0;1], then h￿i
1 generates greater unraveling than h￿i
2.
226 Comparative statics
6.1 The network structure
We now investigate how changes to the network structure a⁄ect unraveling. We consider
changes that correspond to addition/deletion of links or to redistribution of links.
Addition of links. There are several ways in which links can be added to a network.
Let W 1 ￿ W (F 1 ￿ F) be the set of workers (￿rms) that have a degree of at least 1. One
way of adding links is by increasing the degrees of workers in W 1 (￿rms in F 1) so that
the number of workers (￿rms) that have a degree of at least 1 does not change. We call
such an addition of links an increase in the network￿ s density. A di⁄erent way for adding
links involves changes to W 1 (F 1). In particular, one can add links that connect workers
(￿rms) that were not connected before and had a degree of zero. We call such an addition
of links an increase in the network￿ s span. It turns out that increasing a network￿ s density
and increasing a network￿ s span have signi￿cantly di⁄erent e⁄ects on unraveling.




F the degree distributions such
that for every r, ￿
￿
W (￿ ￿ r) = ￿W (r), and ￿
￿
F (￿ ￿ r) = ￿F (r). We say that ￿ is the density
multiplier of ￿W;￿F.21 Proposition 1 implies that increasing the networks￿density leads to
greater unraveling when the initial network is sparse and the increase is small. When the
initial network is dense, increasing the network￿ s density leads to lesser unraveling.
Proposition 1 Let h￿W;￿F;M;￿i be a regular environment and let all ￿rms employ label-













































21Our claims apply to ￿ such that ￿ ￿ r 2 Z+ for every r in the support of ￿F and ￿W.
23Proposition 1 is surprising as it establishes that unraveling is not maximized when the
network is very dense or in the well studied complete market. In particular, Proposition
1 highlights the role of the network in the unraveling process. In markets in which early
information di⁄usion is not based on personal connections we would expect lower levels of
unraveling than in some markets in which connections are important.
The forces that generate the non monotonicity suggested by Proposition 1 are demon-







Figure 1: Consider two markets with two ￿rms and two workers as depicted in ￿gure 1a and
1b. Assume that one of the ￿rms has a very low cost of hiring early and that the other ￿rm has
a very high cost of hiring early. Assume further that only one of the workers receives a signal
sw = h. Then, in the network in ￿gure 1b the ￿rm with the low costs of hiring will make an
early o⁄er to the high signal worker, whereas in ￿gure 1a there is a positive probability that the
high signal worker is not connected to the ￿rm with the low early hiring costs, and therefore
no early o⁄ers will be made. Now assume that both ￿rms have very low costs of hiring early,
and that both workers receive a signal sw = h. Then the network in ￿gure 1a guarantees that
both workers will receive early o⁄ers, whereas in the network in ￿gure 1b there is a positive
probability that both ￿rms make an early o⁄er to the same worker.
More generally, increasing the network￿ s density increases the probability that a worker
w with sw = h and a ￿rm with low enough cf are connected. This leads to an increase in the
number of o⁄ers made in stage S = ￿1, as captured by the increase in e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) for any
e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿). On the other hand, increasing the network￿ s density increases the probability
that fewer workers receive a larger portion of the o⁄ers, as a worker cannot accept more
than one o⁄er, this leads to a lower level of unraveling. This is captured by a decrease in
e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) for any ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿). Since e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) is increasing in e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿), this
implies a decrease in e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) for any ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿).
In contrast, adding connections by increasing the span of the network has a monotone
e⁄ect on unraveling.























F (0) < ￿
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The intuition for Proposition 2 is straightforward. Increasing the number of connected
workers and ￿rms increases the number of o⁄ers at stage S = ￿1 without the adverse e⁄ect
of an increase in density.
Redistribution of links. To capture redistribution of links in the network we use
the standard notion of Mean Preserving Spread (MPS). We focus on redistribution of links
among the workers (￿rms) that have a degree of at least 1, i.e. with no a⁄ect on the span of
the network.22 Proposition 3 predicts greater unraveling in markets in which some ￿rms have
many connections and others have few, relative to markets in which all ￿rms have similar
degrees. On the other hand, lesser unraveling is predicted in markets in which some workers
have many connections and others have few, relative to markets in which all workers have
similar degrees.























F (0) = ￿
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there are more workers with









The probability that a worker receives at least one o⁄er at stage S = ￿1 is increasing and




1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) + e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿
￿
1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿
￿￿rw￿


























￿rms with high and low degrees and less ￿rms with intermediate degrees compared to
22A redistribution of links in a way that changes the span of the network is dominated by the e⁄ect of the








. The probability that a ￿rm f makes an o⁄er to a worker w that is con-
nected to it ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿ (1 ￿ 0:5rf)=(0:5 ￿ rf) is decreasing and convex in rf. Therefore,
e  ￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿ (￿) ￿ e  ￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ (￿).
The observation that greater unraveling is expected in markets in which some ￿rms have
many connections and others have few sheds light on some of the di¢ culties that market
designers face when trying to prevent unraveling. In the market for judicial clerks, attempts
to set the date of the hiring of clerks failed repeatedly. The 9th Circuit (California) is often
claimed to be the one to unravel ￿rst. The reasons for this are under debate: the 9th Circuit
judges point out that the East Coast judges have a geographical advantage as they are close
to more top-ranked law schools. The East Coast circuits claim that the 9th Circuit unravels
as it is less attractive to clerks, due to lower quality of its positions. While not resolving the
debate, Proposition 3 suggests that asymmetry across ￿rms with respect to their connections
leads to greater unraveling.
6.2 Market rules and the accuracy of early information
In this section we study the e⁄ect of changing the post-graduation matching procedure via
changes to ￿M and the e⁄ect of changing the accuracy of early signals available to the workers
at stage S = ￿1 via changes to ￿.
The post-graduation matching procedure￿ s quality (￿M). The following result
shows that increasing ￿M leads to lesser unraveling, providing yet an additional motivation
for the design of more statically-e¢ cient markets.
Proposition 4 Consider two regular environments h￿W;￿F;M1;￿i and h￿W;￿F;M2;￿i such
that ￿M1 ￿ ￿M2, and assume that all ￿rms employ label-free strategies. Then h￿W;￿F;M1;￿i
generates greater unraveling than h￿W;￿F;M2;￿i.
It is also interesting to note that if ￿ ￿ 1￿￿
1+￿ then h￿W;￿F;M1;￿i generates strictly greater
unraveling than h￿W;￿F;M2;￿i whereas otherwise h￿W;￿F;M1;￿i and h￿W;￿F;M2;￿i gen-
erate the same level of unraveling. To see why, note that if ￿ < 1￿￿
1+￿ workers that receive at
least one o⁄er at stage S = ￿1 always accept one of the o⁄ers that they receive (independent
26of ￿M), and e ￿￿W;￿F;M1;￿ = e ￿￿W;￿F;M2;￿ = 1. On the other hand, if ￿ ￿ 1￿￿
1+￿ then for some
￿M, workers reject early o⁄ers from some ￿rms, therefore e ￿￿W;￿F;M1;￿ ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M2;￿.
The connection between the matching procedure in the post-graduation market and the
level of unraveling in a market were recognized in empirical and experimental work in market
design. For example, Kagel and Roth (2000) examine the e⁄ect of the mechanism used in
the post graduation market on the ability of the market to recover from unraveling. Kagel
and Roth ￿nd that "when the centralized mechanisms are introduced, there is only a small
rollback of the unraveling that developed when the market was decentralized. But because
of the congestion and competition in the market, some ￿rms and workers who intend to
make early matches ￿nd themselves unable to do so, and these participate in the centralized
mechanism." As a result, Kagel and Roth conclude, ￿rms and workers ￿nd out that the
matching procedure improved and that they can do better by not hiring early.
The accuracy of the early signal (￿). If ￿ is higher a worker w with sw = h has a
higher probability of being qw = H. Thus w is more likely to reject o⁄ers at stage S = ￿1.
For the same reason, a ￿rm f 2 Nw is more likely to make an o⁄er to w at stage S = ￿1.
These two forces result in a non monotonic relationship between ￿ and the unraveling level
in the market.
Proposition 5 Consider two regular environments h￿W;￿F;M;￿1i and h￿W;￿F;M;￿2i such
that ￿1 ￿ ￿2, and assume that all ￿rms employ label-free strategies. Then,
1. If ￿2 ￿ 1￿￿
1+￿M￿￿ then h￿W;￿F;M;￿2i generates greater unraveling than h￿W;￿F;M;￿1i,
and







￿H￿￿L then h￿W;￿F;M;￿1i generates greater unraveling than
h￿W;￿F;M;￿2i.
If ￿ is very small, a worker w that receives at least one early o⁄er accepts one of the o⁄ers
with probability 1. Thus, a small increase in ￿ only increases the probability that a ￿rm
makes an early o⁄er to a worker w with sw = h, and for every ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿2 (￿) ￿
￿￿W;￿F;M;￿1 (￿). On the other hand, if ￿ is large, a ￿rm that is connected to at least one
27worker w such that sw = h makes an early o⁄er with probability 1. Thus, a further increase
in ￿ only decreases the probability that worker w accepts, and e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿2 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿1.
Remark 2 Worker- and ￿rm-driven unraveling.23
In many entry-level labor markets, information about workers becomes more accurate over
time. Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that the time that workers spend in the training in-
stitutions can be divided into two time segments: early on, ￿ is small and workers would
accept any job o⁄er in order to insure themselves against unemployment. As a result,
￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) 2 [0;1] whereas e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ = 1. This worker-driven unraveling can be more
easily in￿uenced by changes to ￿rms￿incentives, as the incentives of workers to contract
early are too strong to be a⁄ected. Closer to graduation, ￿ is large, and the balance of power
shifts; ￿rms try to hire any high potential worker, whereas workers decline less desirable job
o⁄ers (for all ￿ 2 [0;1], ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) = 1 whereas e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ 2 [0;1]). This ￿rm-driven
unraveling can be more easily in￿uenced by policies that a⁄ect workers￿incentives. Deter-
mining whether stage S = ￿1 is dominated by worker- or ￿rm-driven unraveling depends on
the market of interest.
7 Unraveling and market outcomes
Welfare analysis for two-sided matching markets is subtle as there is an inherent trade-o⁄
between the gain of one agent and the loss of other agents on the same side of the market.
Nevertheless, we are able to make the following observations.
Corollary 2 :










The ￿rst claim captures the insurance that unraveling provides to connected workers.
The second claim points out that unraveling leads to the hiring of low productivity workers
23The division to ￿rm vs. worker driven unraveling was suggested by Li and Suen (2000) who focus on
the di⁄erent qualities of the ￿rms that trigger the unraveling process in each of the types of unraveling.
28and reduces aggregate ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Evaluating aggregate welfare changes in the economy
as a whole requires further assumptions about the outside options of workers and ￿rms.
The idea that unraveling makes some workers better o⁄, and that a centralized match
can hinder unraveling (Proposition 4) helps to account for observed resistance to a match by
groups of individual workers. For example, the match for medical interns to internships was
under scrutiny when an anti-trust suit against the National Residency Matching Program
(NRMP) and numerous other defendants was brought in 2002 by 16 law ￿rms on behalf
of 3 former residents seeking to represent the class of all former residents (and naming as
defendants a class including all hospitals that employ residents). It was dismissed on August
12, 2004 in an Opinion, Order & Judgment by Judge Paul L. Friedman.24
8 Conclusion
This paper is a ￿rst attempt to tackle the phenomenon of early hiring in entry-level labor
markets in the presence of social networks connecting employers and potential workers. To
this end, we propose a model of local interaction in which information ￿ ows via connections in
a network. While the idea that social networks are used as a mean of transferring information,
and in particular information related to job search, is widely accepted in the economic
literature, it has not yet been incorporated into the analysis of the timing of hiring in labor
markets. Our model provides a ￿rst step in this direction.
In our model, the incentives of ￿rms to make early o⁄ers depend on the aggregate level of
early hiring which in turn depends on the entire network structure in complex ways. Thus, a
￿rm￿ s best response depend on the ￿rm￿ s beliefs with respect to the entire network structure.
To overcome that we provide formal analysis of ￿rms beliefs in large networks that are chosen
at random and combine tools from graph theory, matching theory, and market design.
We ￿nd that the structure of the network a⁄ects unraveling in systematic ways. Moreover,
we show that improving the design of the post-graduation market by improving the quality
of the match between workers and ￿rms leads to lesser unraveling.
24Much of the discussion surrounding the lawsuit revolved around the e⁄ect of the match on salaries. See
also Bulow and Levin (2006), Niederle and Roth (2003), and Kojima (2007). Nevertheless, Niederle and
Roth ￿nd no such e⁄ect.
299 Appendix
9.1 Matching procedures - de￿nitions
In the absence of a meaningful network, the analysis of stage S = 0 lends itself to the more
familiar analysis of one-to-one matching markets. Formally, let w0 and f0 be the null worker
and ￿rm.
De￿nition 8 (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) For a set of workers W 0 and a set of ￿rms F 0, a
one-to-one matching is a function M : W 0[F 0 ! W 0[F 0[fw0;f0g such that w = M(f)
if and only if M(w) = f and for all w 2 W 0 and f 2 F 0:
￿ either M(w) 2 F 0 or M(w) = f0, and
￿ either M(f) 2 W 0 or M(f) = w0
Much of the matching literature focuses on ￿xed exogenous sets of workers and ￿rms
with perfect information. In our environment, the sets of workers and ￿rms that reach stage
S = 0 unmatched (W 0
H;W 0
L, and F 0) are determined endogenously in stage S = ￿1 and we
are required to de￿ne a notion of a matching procedure. Intuitively, a matching procedure
captures the rules of the market which in turn determine the mapping from sets of workers
and ￿rms to a probability distribution over matchings.
Denote the set of all subsets of a set A (the power set of set A) by P (A).





be the set of all probability distributions on elements of M(W 0;F 0). A





We now de￿ne the notions of anonymous matching procedures and of matching proce-
dures that guarantee a stable matching.












of workers￿utility functions such that for some i 6= j, uwi = u0
wj and uwj = u0
wi and for any
k = 2 fi;jg, uwk = u0







be a pro￿le of workers￿utility functions
such that there exist two ￿rms f0 and f00 such that: (1) for every j, uwj (f0) = u00
wj (f00) and
uwj (f00) = u00
wj (f0); and (2) for every f 2 Fnff0;f00g and for every j, uwj (f) = u00
wj (f). A
matching procedure is anonymous if for every W 0 ￿ W and F 0 ￿ F and in every matching
M that has a positive probability given the matching procedure the following holds:25
1. for any f 2 F 0, Pr[M(wi) = fjU] = Pr[M(wj) = fjU0] and for any k = 2 fi;jg,
Pr[M(wk) = fjU] = Pr[M(wk) = fjU0].
25A matching procedure is anonymous if it depends only on the preferences of workers￿and ￿rms￿and
not on their labels or position in the network. As ￿rms￿payo⁄ functions are identical at stage S = 0, an
anonymous matching procedure will depend only on the workers￿preferences as captured by the de￿nition.
302. for any w 2 W, Pr[M(w) = f0jU] = Pr[M(w) = f00jU00] and for every f 2 F 0nff0;f00g,
Pr[M(w) = fjU] = Pr[M(w) = fjU00].
De￿nition 11 A matching procedure guarantees a stable matching if for every W 0 and
F 0 and in every matching M that has a positive probability given the matching procedure the
following holds: [1] for any w 2 W 0 and f 2 F 0 such that M(w) = f, uw (￿jM(w) = f) ￿
uw (￿jM(w) = f0) and ￿f (￿jM(f) = w) ￿ ￿f (￿jM(f) = w0) (for any matched worker and
￿rm, both prefer to be matched to the other than be unmatched); and [2] for any w 2 W 0
and f 2 F 0 such that M(w) = f0 and M(f) = w0, uw (￿jM(w) = f0) > uw (￿jM(w) = f)
or ￿f (￿jM(f) = w0) > ￿f (￿jM(f) = w) (for any unmatched worker and ￿rm, at least one
of them prefers not to be matched to the other).
9.2 Best response correspondence: ￿rms
In any equilibrium, ￿rm f makes a job o⁄er at stage S = ￿1 if there exists at least one









> EG(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ [￿f] (10)
and does not make an o⁄er if the inequality is reversed for all w 2 W. Since by de￿nition
Prfw acceptsg = 1 ￿ Prfw rejectsg, condition (10) can be restated.
Pr
h
qw = HjNf;f Wh
i
￿ ￿H + Pr
h
qw = LjNf;f Wh
i
￿ ￿L ￿ cf > EG(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ [￿f] (11)
Recall that W 0
q is the set of workers of productivity q that reach stage S = 0 unmatched,
and F 0 is the set of ￿rms that reach stage S = 0 unmatched. By Lemma 1, if high produc-
tivity workers are scarce and if no worker who receives a low signal in stage S = ￿1 is hired
early (in stage S = ￿1 ), EG(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ [￿f] = jW0
Hj
jF0j ￿ ￿H. Moreover, following condition
(3), condition (11) never holds for any worker w such that sw = l, or for any worker w = 2 Nf
(because the ￿rm did not receive credible information regarding sw). Consequently, scarcity
of high productivity workers implies that ￿rm f is better o⁄ making a job o⁄er at stage
S = ￿1 if and only if f Wh 6= ; and


















2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ nw
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ nf
=
1




r=0 ￿F (r) ￿ r
P1
r=0 ￿W (r) ￿ r
To see why the second equality holds, note that for nw;nf;￿W (r);￿F (r) to be consistent





31Therefore, condition (12) can be rewritten as
￿ ￿ ￿H + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L ￿ cf >
1




r=0 ￿F (r) ￿ r
P1
r=0 ￿W (r) ￿ r
￿ ￿H (13)
and the ex-ante probability that a randomly chosen ￿rm with degree r makes an o⁄er at
stage S = ￿1, conditional on f Wh 6= ; and the expectation that ￿ = ￿1, is







￿ ￿ ￿H + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L ￿ cf >
1




r=0 ￿F (r) ￿ r
P1





￿ ￿ ￿H + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿L ￿
1




r=0 ￿F (r) ￿ r
P1
r=0 ￿W (r) ￿ r
￿ ￿H
￿
9.3 Best response correspondence: workers
In any equilibrium, worker w accepts a job o⁄er at stage S = ￿1 if there exists at least one
￿rm f 2 e Fw such that









and does not accept any job o⁄er if the inequality is reversed.
Combining Lemma 1 and the observation that a worker w does not receive an early o⁄er
unless sw = h, condition (15) can be simpli￿ed to
1 + ￿wf > ￿ ￿ EG(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ [uwjH] (16)
Pick an edge (f;w) 2 E u.a.r. If all workers expect ￿ = ￿1, then the ex-ante probability
that condition (16) holds for (f;w) is







1 + ￿wf > ￿ ￿ EG(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ [uwjH;￿1]
￿
(18)
= 1 ￿ H
￿
￿ ￿ EG(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ [uwjH;￿1] ￿ 1
￿
(19)
Recall that H is continuous. Thus, ￿G;M;￿ (￿) is the induced probability that a worker that
received exactly one job o⁄er at stage ￿1 accepts the o⁄er. Similarly, a worker that received
exactly m o⁄ers at stage S = ￿1 accepts an o⁄er with probability 1 ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿G;M;￿ (￿)
￿m.
Conditional on accepting an o⁄er, worker w solves the following maximization problem
to decide which o⁄er to accept:
Maxf2 e Fw1 + ￿wf
329.4 Proofs
Lemma 2 Let h￿W;￿F;￿i exhibit scarcity of high productivity workers, and let b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
be any network that is consistent with ￿W;￿F and nw. Assume further that no worker who re-
ceive a low signal in stage S = ￿1 is hired early (in stage S = ￿1). Let n
b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
w (H;0;￿)
be a random variable (r.v.) that captures the number of workers of high productivity that are
not hired in stage S = ￿1 and let n
b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
f (0;￿) be a r.v. that captures the number of














w (sw) be a r.v. that captures the proportion of workers that receive a signal
sw in stage S = ￿1, and let p0;nw
w (sw;H) be a r.v. that captures the proportion of workers
that receive a signal sw in stage S = ￿1 AND are of high productivity in stage S = 0.
Let ￿
b G(￿W;￿F;nw) (￿) be a r.v. that captures the number of workers hired in stage S = ￿1.
Let p
0; b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
w (H;0) be a r.v. that captures the proportion of workers that are of high





b G(￿W ;￿F ;nw)
f (0;￿)￿￿
b G(￿W ;￿F ;nw)(￿)
n
b G(￿W ;￿F ;nw)
f (0;￿)
is a r.v. that captures the proportion of ￿rms
that are not matched before stage S = 0. Then,
p
0; b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
w (H;0) ￿ p
0;nw







where the inequality holds because p￿1;nw
w (h) ￿
￿
b G(￿W ;￿F ;nw)(￿)
nw is the proportion of workers
who receive high signal and are not hired at stage S = ￿1. This equals the proportion of
workers that receive high signal, are of high productivity, and are not hired at stage S = ￿1
only if all of the high signal workers who are not hired at stage S = ￿1 are also of high
productivity.



















































f (￿) = nf ￿ ￿






￿ nw ￿ ￿
b G(￿W;￿F;nw) (22)


















since by de￿nition n
b G(￿W;￿F;nw)




w (H;0;￿) = nw ￿
p
0; b G(￿W;￿F;nw)





> 0, the proof is complete.
Lemma 1 - Proof. The proof of part 1 of the Lemma is immediate from the de￿nitions
above. The proof for part 2 is as follows:
Let z(w;F 0;￿;￿) ￿ ff 2 F 0j j1 + ￿wf ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)j < ￿g and denote the empty set by
?. For given ￿ 2 [0;1], and ￿ > 0 consider the following algorithm:
Let W = c W 0
H and F = b F 0
While W 6= ? and F 6= ?
Select w 2 W uniformly at random
If z(w;F;￿;￿) 6= ?
Pick a ￿rm f 2 z(w;F;￿;￿) uniformly at random
Match w to f
Let W = Wnw and F = Fnf
Otherwise
Pick a ￿rm f 2 F uniformly at random
Match w to f
Let W = Wnw and F = Fnf
The algorithm matches a ￿rm and a worker at every iteration and therefore always stops
when either W 6= ? or F 6= ? and provides a stable matching. The probability distribution
over the outcomes of the algorithm is a matching procedure M (W 0;F 0). The anonymity of
the procedure is directly implied by the randomness in the selection of the worker and the
￿rm out of the relevant sets.
It is left to show that for every w 2 W that is selected by the algorithm and any F that
is reached by the algorithm given a network b G(￿W;￿F;nw),
limnw!1Pr[z(w;F;￿;￿) 6= ?] = 1
Let n
b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
w (H;0) be a r.v. that captures the number of workers of high productivity
that are not hired at stage S = ￿1 and let n
b G(￿W;￿F;nw)
f (0) be a r.v. that captures the number













Let jAj be the number of elements in a set A. For any nw and at every iteration of the




w (H;0;￿), and this holds with equality only
when the last worker e w 2 W is chosen by the algorithm. As a result, there exists ￿ > 0 such










Pr(limnw!1 jFj > ￿ ￿ nw) = 1
To complete the proof, ￿x ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0, and consider a randomly selected worker e w
and a set e F (nw) of ￿ ￿nw ￿rms that is chosen independently of the worker￿ s preferences. Let
B (nw) be the event that there is no ￿rm e f 2 e F (nw) such that
￿ ￿ ￿1 + ￿ e w e f ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿.
Recall that ￿ e w e f is distributed H with positive density in every point in the support [￿￿;￿].
Then,
Pr(B (nw)) = (1 ￿ [H(￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿) ￿ H(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)])
￿￿nw
and
limnw!1Pr(B (nw)) = 0
It is only left to recall that when there is no ￿rm e f 2 e F (nw) such that
￿ ￿ ￿1 + ￿ e w e f ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿ <
￿, ￿ e wf is bounded.
De￿nition 12 For two random variables (r.v.) X;Y with support on some countably in-
￿nite set X, the total variational distance between X and Y , TV D(X;Y ), is de￿ned as P
x2X jPr(X = x) ￿ Pr(Y = x)j.
For a distribution over networks ￿G let b
F
(r;￿G) be the random vector of length r
chosen as follows: [1] choose a network G according to ￿G, [2] choose a worker with degree
r u.a.r. from all workers with degree r in G, and [3] let b
F
(r;￿G) be the vector of the
degrees of all ￿rms in Nw ordered randomly (with equal probability given to each ordering).
Let b
0F
(r;￿F) be a vector of length r such that for every i 2 f1;2;:::;rg, b
0F
i equals r0 with







are determined independently of each
other.










￿ ￿ = 0
35Lemma 4 Let ￿W;￿F have ￿nite support and h￿W;￿F;￿i exhibit scarcity of high productivity
workers. Consider a market procedure M that is parameterized by ￿M 2 [0;1]. Assume that
all ￿rms employ label-free strategies. Finally, let  G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (b ￿) be the r.v. that captures
the fraction of workers hired at stage S = ￿1 if all ￿rms and workers best respond to the
belief that ￿ = b ￿. Then, for every ￿ > 0 and b ￿ 2 [0;1]
limnw!1 Pr
￿￿ ￿ ￿ G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (b ￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (b ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿
￿
= 1
Proof. Following condition (3) and the discussion in sections 9.2 and 9.3, a worker w has a
positive probability to be hired at stage S = ￿1 only if sw = h and rw ￿ 1.
Consider a network G. Select worker w u.a.r. and then select a ￿rm f 2 Nw u.a.r. Let
￿G;M;￿ (￿) be the probability that f makes an early o⁄er to w if sw = h. Recall that the
realization (qw;sw) is independent of anything else, then by Lemma 3,
limnw!1￿G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿) = e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿)
Note also that by Lemma 1 and De￿nition 2, for any W 0
H;W 0
L;F 0 that are possible under










￿ (1 + ￿M ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ < ￿
and therefore
limnw!1￿G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿) = e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿
which in turn, together with the independence of f￿wfgf2F and Lemma 3 imply that as
nw ! 1 the probability that w receives at least one early o⁄er (at S = ￿1) that she would
like to accept, conditional on sw = h, converges to
1 ￿
￿
(1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿)) + e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿
￿
1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿
￿￿rw
For a given graph G let b wh (G) be a r.v. that captures the number of workers in the
set c Wh (G) = fw 2 Wjrw ￿ 1 and sw = hg and let xW (G) =
b wh(G)
nw . Let P
c W (￿jG) be the
degree distribution of workers in c Wh (G). The probability that a randomly chosen worker








(1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿)) + e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿
￿
1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿
￿￿rw￿








(2) for any r, Pr
￿
limnw!1P
c W (rjG(nw;￿W;￿F)) = P (r;￿W)
￿
= 1.
Theorem 1 - Proof. By the convexity of the support for ￿ and the continuity of
e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) a ￿xed point exists.
36We now show that if ￿￿ = e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿￿) then ￿￿ is a 0-equilibrium with h￿W;￿F;M;￿i.
The proof goes in two steps. First, Lemma 4 implies that for any ￿ > 0 there exists nw such
that for any n0
w > nw, Pr
￿
 G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿￿) 2 [￿￿ ￿ ￿;￿￿ + ￿]
￿
> 1 ￿ ￿.
Second, we are required to show that for any " > 0 there exists ￿ such that for any ￿
0 < ￿,
workers￿and ￿rms￿best responses for ￿￿ satisfy the conditions for an "-equilibrium for any
￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿ ￿
0;￿￿ + ￿
0]. The latter follows from the continuity (and independence of nw) of the
conditions on ￿rms￿and workers￿decisions (equations 13 and 16).
Since the payo⁄s of workers and ￿rms are bounded, Step 2 completes the proof that if
￿￿ = e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿￿) then ￿￿ is a 0-equilibrium with h￿W;￿F;M;￿i.
We are left to show that if ￿￿ is a 0-equilibriumwith h￿W;￿F;M;￿i then ￿￿ = e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿￿).
Assume by contradiction that ￿￿ = e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿￿) + { for some { 6= 0. Then by Lemma 4
and following the argument from step 1 above, for any ￿ > 0 there exists nw such that for
any n0
w > nw, Pr
￿
 G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿￿) 2 [￿￿ + { ￿ ￿;￿￿ + { + ￿]
￿
> 1 ￿ ￿.




 G(nw;￿W;￿F);M;￿ (￿￿) 2 [￿￿ ￿ ￿1;￿￿ + ￿1]
￿
￿ ￿1 < 1 ￿ ￿1, contradiction to ￿￿ being a
0-equilibrium.






























@￿ = 0. In regular environments, we can rely on Corollary 1 and prove the
Proposition by showing that there exists r(M;￿);r(M;￿) 2 Z+ such that if max
￿
￿H ￿ rj￿F (r) > 0
￿
<










F ;M;￿ (￿), and if min
￿














To reduce the notation that we carry throughout the proof, ￿x ￿W;￿F;M;￿, and ￿

















x = ￿ ￿e ￿. We can drop the ￿ argument since a claim of greater di⁄usion is proved by a shift




F;M;￿ (￿) for every ￿ 2 [0;1] and since ￿ and e ￿ (and x) are independent of ￿ and
therefore can be treated of as exogenous for a given ￿. Substituting in the de￿nitions of e ￿
and x and some algebra yields,
e  ￿ =
1
2
￿ (1 ￿ ￿W (0)) ￿
1 X
rw=1





￿ (1 ￿ ￿W (0)) ￿
1
2












e P (rf;￿F) ￿ [(1 ￿ 0:5






























e P (rf;￿F) ￿ [(1 ￿ 0:5








Let ’￿ (rw;rf) = [1 ￿ x ￿ [(1 ￿ 0:5￿￿rf)=(0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ rf)]]
￿￿rw. We note three important facts:




























Thus to prove Proposition 1 it is su¢ cient to show that:
￿ Step 1: ’2 (rw;1) ￿ ’1 (rw;1).
￿ Step 2: there exists ￿(M;￿) 2 Z+ such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿(M;￿) and any rw 2 Z+,
@ ln(’￿(rw;1))
@￿ ￿ 0.
















’1(rw;1) ￿ 1 as required, we note that given that H has median 0, for
any ￿M 2 [0;1], e ￿ ￿ 1







￿0:5 + 0:75 ￿ x
(1 ￿ x)









’1(rw;1) ￿ 1 and ’2 (rw;1) ￿ ’1 (rw;1) which concludes the proof of Step 1.





= ￿ ￿ rw ￿ ln[1 ￿ x ￿ (1 ￿ 0:5
￿)=(0:5 ￿ ￿)] (30)






= rw ￿ ln[1 ￿ x ￿ (1 ￿ 0:5
￿￿r)=(0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ r)] + (31)
+
[x ￿ ￿ ￿ rw ￿ ln(0:5) ￿ 0:5￿￿r ￿ r + x ￿ rw ￿ x ￿ rw ￿ 0:5￿￿r]
0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ r ￿ x + x ￿ 0:5￿￿r (32)
Thus, for any rw > 0,
@ ln(’￿(rw;1))
@￿ ￿ 0 whenever
ln[1 ￿ x ￿ [(1 ￿ 0:5
￿)=(0:5 ￿ ￿)]] +
[x ￿ ￿ ￿ ln(0:5) ￿ 0:5￿ + x ￿ x ￿ 0:5￿]
0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ x + x ￿ 0:5￿ ￿ 0 (33)
In Step 2, we are interested in the sign of
@ ln(’￿(rw;1))
@￿ for large ￿. For any x and for any
￿ ￿ 2, 0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ x + x ￿ 0:5￿ > 0, so inequality (33) holds if and only if
(0:5 ￿ ￿ ￿ x + x ￿ 0:5
￿)￿ln[1 ￿ x ￿ [(1 ￿ 0:5
￿)=(0:5 ￿ ￿)]]+x￿￿￿ln(0:5)￿0:5
￿+x￿x￿0:5
￿ ￿ 0 (34)







x ￿ ln[1 ￿ x ￿ (1 ￿ 0:5￿)=(0:5 ￿ ￿)] + x ￿ ￿ ￿ ln(0:5) ￿ x
￿
= x ￿ ln(0:5) > ￿1 (36)
Consequently, a su¢ cient condition for inequality (33) to hold is
lim￿!1

























































39As a result, condition (37) is satis￿ed for any x > 0, and inequality (33) holds for any
x ￿ 0 as required.
Proposition 2 - Proof. We rely on Corollary 1 and prove the Proposition by showing
that for every ￿ 2 [0;1], e  ￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ (￿) ￿ e  ￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿ (￿).




















































F;M;￿ (￿) = ￿￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿ (￿); e ￿￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ (￿) = e ￿￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿ (￿); and e ￿￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ = e ￿￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿
Then, by the de￿nition of e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿ (expression 7), the di⁄erence in ￿W implies that for
every ￿ 2 [0;1],
e  ￿1
W;￿1




Proposition 3 - Proof. We rely on Corollary 1 and prove the Proposition by showing
that for every ￿ 2 [0;1], e  ￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ (￿) ￿ e  ￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿ (￿).













Therefore, for every ￿ 2 [0;1],
￿￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ (￿) = ￿￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿ (￿) and e ￿￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ = e ￿￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿











1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) + e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿
￿
1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿
￿￿rw￿
is increasing ine ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿
and increasing and concave in rw. Thus, for every ￿ 2 [0;1],
e  ￿1
W;￿1
F;M;￿ (￿) ￿ e  ￿2
W;￿2
F;M;￿ (￿)
which completes the proof.
Proposition 4 - Proof. We rely on Corollary 1 and prove the Proposition by showing
that for every ￿ 2 [0;1], e  ￿W;￿F;M1;￿ (￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M1;￿ (￿).
By de￿nition, for every ￿ 2 [0;1],





1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) + e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿) ￿
￿
1 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿
￿￿rw￿
is decreasing in e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿.
Thus, for every ￿ 2 [0;1],
e  ￿W;￿F;M1;￿ (￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M1;￿ (￿)
40which completes the proof.
Proposition 5 - Proof. We rely on Corollary 1 and prove the Proposition by showing
that: [1] if ￿2 < ￿ then for every ￿ 2 [0;1], e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿2 (￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿1 (￿), and [2] if
￿1 > ￿ then for every ￿ 2 [0;1], e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿1 (￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿2 (￿).
Part 1: Recall that e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ = 1￿H[￿ ￿ (1 + ￿M ￿ ￿) ￿ 1] and that H has the support
[￿￿;￿] where ￿ 2 (0;1). Let ￿2 ￿ 1￿￿
1+￿M￿￿, thus ￿i ￿ (1 + ￿M ￿ ￿) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿ for i = 1;2, and
e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿1 = e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿2 = 1. Recall that by de￿nition, for every ￿ 2 [0;1],
￿￿W;￿F;M;￿2 (￿) ￿ ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿1 (￿) and e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿2 (￿) ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿1 (￿)
implying that for every ￿ 2 [0;1], e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿2 (￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿1 (￿).
Part 2: Recall that ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿ (￿1) = D
￿






r=0 ￿W(r)￿r ￿ ￿H
￿







r=0 ￿W(r)￿r ￿ ￿H ￿ ￿L
￿H ￿ ￿L






r=0 ￿W(r)￿r ￿￿H ￿ c for i = 1;2, and






Recall that by de￿nition e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿2 ￿ e ￿￿W;￿F;M;￿1 implying that for every ￿ 2 [0;1],
e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿2 (￿) ￿ e  ￿W;￿F;M;￿1 (￿).
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